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Introduction 
Edward Elgar Publishing has published in 2008 a collection of papers on incomplete markets, 
under the editorship of Magill and Quinzii, covering the contribution of general equilibrium 
theory to the analysis of financial markets. It turned out to be a timely publication in view of 
the recent financial crisis which has dramatically highlighted the shortcomings of current 
macroeconomic modeling in ignoring the crucial interdependence between the real and the 
financial spheres.  
"Every now and then new concepts and techniques emerge which lead to a fresh 
way of looking at old problems: hitherto disjoint or disconnected subfields come 
together to form parts of a coherent whole. Economists have long been interested 
in the relationship between the real, financial and monetary sectors of an 
economy. Traditionally, the analysis of the real sector was the purview of 
equilibrium theory and microeconomics (price theory), financial markets were the 
subjects of finance, while monetary theory formed part of macroeconomics. The 
object of this book is to show that the newly emerging theory of incomplete 
markets provides a useful framework for unifying these subfields and for 
clarifying the mutual dependence between real, financial and monetary 
phenomena." 
(Opening sentence in the book of Magill and Quinzii, Theory of Incomplete 
Markets, MIT Press, 1996.) 
Much remains to be done, no doubt, to accomplish the full integration envisioned by the 
authors of this quotation. But they are undoubtedly right in pointing to the emergence of the 
theory of incomplete-markets economies in the late sixties and early seventies as a major 
development, which has already enriched significantly our understanding of the functioning 
of our economies and which carries the promise of the contemplated integration. 
The purpose of the present note is to highlight the seminal contributions of Diamond, Drèze 
and Radner to these developments, following Arrow's paper on "The Role of Securities in the 
Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing" (1964).1 
Market incompleteness is a characteristic feature of contemporary market economies. This 
feature is particularly notable for future and contingent markets. When facing substantial 
uncertainty, agents are indeed reluctant to make detailed commitments into the future, the 
associated transactions costs being prohibitive. Hence markets for future or contingent 
deliveries are missing: actual economies do not operate as postulated by the idealized theory 
of general equilibrium. A host of important questions arise. They start with the definition of a 
suitable equilibrium concept, its existence and properties, and of course the status of the two 
welfare theorems.  
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 The founding papers of Arrow, Diamond, Radner and Drèze are reproduced in Magill and Quinzii (2008). 
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Early work in the finance literature did not stress market incompleteness, because the 
questions addressed and the models used did not bring out the importance of that feature. The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem of 1958 relies on an arbitrage argument between existing assets 
(stocks and bonds). The CAPM model of Markowitz (1952), Tobin (1958) and their followers 
relies on mean-variance preferences, these parameters being priced on the markets, which are 
thus implicitly complete.  
The contribution of Peter Diamond 
A first model of an incomplete-markets production economy was introduced in 1967 in a 
seminal paper of Peter Diamond, "The role of a stock market in a general equilibrium model 
with technological uncertainty". That paper builds on Kenneth Arrow's representation of 
uncertainty through “states of the world” that led to the theory of general equilibrium known 
as the “Arrow-Debreu model”. Diamond introduces (admittedly a special case of) the basic 
model of incomplete-markets economies – still in use today – where uncertainty is described 
by an event tree, markets exist only for trading in spot commodities and in a limited set of 
assets or contracts. The only assets considered by Diamond were shares of stock of business 
firms. In its more general formulation (see below), that model describes well the market 
organization prevailing in modern economies.2 It lends itself both to formal generality and to 
specificity of market incompleteness. It is often referred to as the model of “stock market 
economies".  
In comparison with the standard general equilibrium model of the time, namely that of 
Debreu’s Theory of Value (1959), there are two important new features: (i) the missing 
markets result in limited insurance opportunities, hence multiple budget constraints and 
limited information about prices of contingent claims; (ii) business firms serve a dual role, as 
producers of commodities and as suppliers of assets. Combining these two features, one notes 
that investment decisions of firms are not guided by market prices for future production in 
alternative events, these very markets being incomplete! Yet investment decisions are 
relevant, not only to the welfare of future consumers, but also to the future profits, hence 
dividends of the firms. Dividends accrue to shareholders. Somehow, the decisions of the firms 
must arbitrate between the interests of future consumers and those of current shareholders, 
with the latter holding control. And shareholders must reach collective decisions. 
In Diamond’s 1967 model, the new difficulties are eschewed by special assumptions. First, 
there is a single commodity, which limits the interests of future consumers to bare essentials 
namely the distribution of production possibilities across future events – state-distribution for 
short. Second, the technology has fixed coefficients i.e. the state-distribution of future output 
by each firm is given and is not a decision variable. Thus, the decision problem of each firm 
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 Perhaps the most significant further development is the extensive securitisation of otherwise non-marketable 
assets or contracts. It was discovered early on that creation of new assets is not invariably conducive to Pareto 
improvements. More recently, an example in Drèze et al. (2008) illustrates how securitisation together with 
asymmetric information can be conducive to proliferation of “toxic” assets.   
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boils down to a choice of scale (of investment level). Third, there are two periods only, with a 
single commodity, no markets are needed in the future, and there is no price uncertainty.  
Under these assumptions, existence of equilibria is not problematic and Diamond is mostly 
concerned with efficiency of equilibria. The relevant concept is not first-best Pareto 
efficiency, because incomplete markets entail incomplete, hence inefficient risk-sharing. 
Instead, a concept of "constrained efficiency" is introduced, efficiency relative to the set of 
allocations that can be realized under the prevailing market structure. Competitive 
equilibrium on the stock market3 brings about a constrained-efficient allocation of investment 
unanimously endorsed by the shareholders of each firm; and every constrained-efficient 
allocation can be sustained by competitive stock prices. Thus, the two welfare theorems hold, 
under a suitable (constrained) reformulation. Intuitively, Diamond’s conclusions are not 
surprising. In his model, every feasible investment project is priced on the stock market and 
this by-passes market-incompleteness.4 
Diamond's Model (as it is commonly referred to) was inspired to a considerable extent by the 
finance literature of his days, which also concentrated on two-period single-commodity 
models. What Diamond added is the investment decisions. A first degree of integration 
between price theory and finance had been realized. 
There is more to come but the path was open, and the significance of Diamond’s paper to the 
sequel stands out clearly. He introduced the stock-market economies model that still retains 
attention today and the concept of constrained efficiency that proved central in later work. 
The contribution of Roy Radner 
Whereas Diamond took advantage of his special assumptions to build a transparent model and 
reached important conclusions, a general formulation was investigated by Roy Radner. In two 
papers (1967 and 1968) Radner reconsiders the Arrow-Debreu model and introduces 
differences in information across agents, but does not come to grips with market 
incompleteness. The decisive contribution comes with "Existence of equilibrium of plans, 
prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets" which appeared in (1972), a result 
that he later generalized (1979).  
The 1972 paper considers a model with several goods, several time periods and general 
technologies. Agents being endowed with single-valued, common correct expectations about 
future prices, the equilibrium concept embodies perfect foresight.5 The aspect of collective 
decisions in firms is eschewed, by endowing firms with preferences of their own.  
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 Alternatively stated: investment following Tobin’s q. 
4
 This property has been studied extensively under the name of “spanning”, starting with Ekern and Wilson 
(1974).  
5
 That property is definitely more demanding than rational expectations, as defined in the meantime by Muth 
(1961).  
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Radner proves existence of allocations at which the trades and plans of all agents are optimal, 
and all markets clear, provided share prices on the stock market are uniformly positive, a gap 
that has been partly filled in the ensuing literature when more suitable decision criteria for 
firms were introduced.6  
To this date, the name "Radner Equilibrium" is still associated with perfect foresight 
equilibria in incomplete-markets economies.7 The significance of his work lies on the 
consistency of an equilibrium concept defined for a general model embodying rationality of 
plans and expectations. It is a remarkable achievement, and a benchmark of lasting value.  
The contribution of Jacques Drèze 
The collective decision aspect remained to be tackled. This was accomplished by Jacques 
Drèze in two papers, which appeared in 1972 and 1974. Drèze starts from Diamond’s model, 
but with general convex technologies instead of fixed coefficients. This simple extension 
leads however to a "collective decision" problem because shareholders will typically not be 
unanimous about the production decisions of firms.   
In an attempt at assessing the scope for efficiency, Drèze studies the conditions for 
constrained efficiency of production (investment) decisions. The conditions sought for are 
clear: it is necessary that the decision of each individual firm be Pareto-efficient from the 
viewpoint of the final shareholders of that firm, holding constant the production decisions of 
the other firms and the portfolios of the shareholders. Note that the production plan of a firm 
entails the same state-distribution of dividends for all its shareholders. For them, it has the 
properties of a public good. So, the conditions for efficiency are analogous to the Lindahl-
Samuelson conditions for efficient production of a public good. In the case at hand, they 
receive a transparent formulation: each firm should maximize profits at shadow prices 
obtained as weighted averages of the shadow prices of shareholders, the weights being given 
by shareholdings. This is known as the "Drèze Criterion" for business decisions under 
incomplete markets, a criterion which has received since a number of extensions and 
applications, and remains of current interest.  
More importantly perhaps, Drèze noted that the set of feasible allocations in a stock-market 
economy is not convex. The budget constraints of the consumers (multiple constraints under 
incomplete markets) are indeed bilinear in production plans and portfolio shares. 
Simultaneous adjustments in these two sets of variables allow efficiency gains that are not in 
sight under separate adjustments. As a consequence, competitive equilibria of the stock 
market coupled with Pareto-efficient decisions of all firms need not be constrained efficient, a 
property that has been later shown to hold generically by Geneakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and 
Drèze (1990). A crucial implication of this property is that there almost always exists scope 
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 "Partly", due to the model specification in Drèze (1974) or to special assumptions in Grossman and Hart 
(1979). More recently, Drèze et al. (2009) introduced a concept of “investment-constrained equilibrium” to cover 
the case of undersubscribed stock emissions, thereby opening a new link to finance theory. 
7
 The more commonplace term is “General Equilibrium with Incomplete markets” or GEI. 
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for Pareto improvements through departures from competitive outcomes on either commodity 
or asset markets (or both). A significant application to “second-best wage rigidities” is cited 
below. 
With this important discovery of constrained sub optimality of stock-market equilibria, the 
theory of incomplete-markets economies was definitely under way. It has received substantial 
attention from researchers ever since. For evidence of global interest in the model, one can 
refer to the special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics (Vol. 19, 1990), to the 
survey by Magill and Shafer in the Handbook of Mathematical Economics (Vol. 4, North-
Holland, 1991), to the book by Magill and Quinzii, Theory of Incomplete Markets, quoted at 
the outset, or to the collection of papers on incomplete markets edited by Magill and Quinzii 
(2008).8  
Extensions of the standard model of a stock-market economy 
The question arises whether firms would serve the interests of their shareholders by 
maximizing future stock market value. It was noted by Drèze (1974) that a change in the 
production plan of a firm might not be advantageous to the shareholders, even if it raised 
market value, unless "the change had positive value at the new stock prices". This is a 
different condition altogether. It brings in the stock market responses to production 
adjustments. These responses are in the nature of price derivatives, not prices. They are not 
directly observable, hence not covered by the assumption of perfect foresight.  
Grossman and Hart introduced in 1979 the special assumption that each shareholder expects 
future stock prices to validate his or her own shadow prices on future states. A more general 
formulation is developed in Drèze, Lachiri and Minelli (2009). A recent paper by Bonnisseau 
and Lachiri (2004) established that constrained efficiency in the multi-period setting requires 
firms to adopt at each node (period–state) the Drèze criterion with weights given by 
shareholdings at that node. Again, the relevant information is not observable, thus confirming 
the limitations of competitive outcomes when markets are incomplete. 
Other forms of corporate governance have been proposed based on majority voting among 
shareholders, an approach that runs into the Condorcet paradox of voting which precludes 
existence of equilibria. Drèze (1985 and 1989) has explored the more realistic alternative of 
introducing an endogenous board of directors with veto powers, the decisions of which are 
subject to approval by a majority vote among shareholders. In his 1989 lecture, Drèze has 
introduced the possibility of incomplete preferences using the Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975) 
framework. I  ncompleteness of preferences is however limited to firms and ought to be 
extended to households.  
A further extension consists in introducing labor contracts. It was noted early on by James 
Meade (1972, p. 426) that "While property owners can spread their risks by putting small bits 
of their property into a large number of concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of his effort 
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 This collection of papers in two volumes covers the period 1964 – 2005.  
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into a large number of different jobs. This presumably is a main reason why we find risk-
bearing capital hiring labor rather than risk-bearing labor hiring capital". That observation 
was already at the root of the theory of implicit labor contracts developed in the mid-
seventies. There, firms are risk-neutral and workers are risk-averse. Stock-market economies 
provide a natural framework for a more sophisticated analysis of labor contracts. This is done 
in Drèze (1989), and in Drèze and Gollier (1993) where risk-sharing considerations are shown 
to validate (at the second-best level) some degree of wage rigidity. This establishes a link to 
macroeconomics and the concept of equilibrium with price rigidities earlier introduced by 
Drèze (1975). 
Concluding remarks 
The foregoing suggests that models of stock-market economies are providing a suitable 
framework to integrate price theory and finance, and that a beginning has been made to 
extend the integration in the direction of macroeconomics. The opening quotation refers 
specifically to money; that is natural for Magill and Quinzii, who devote a chapter of their 
book to monetary economies – but with a particular modeling of money. Other authors have 
linked monetary policy to stock prices along different lines, either by noting the influence of 
stock prices on aggregate demand9 or by suggesting that monetary policy could play a role 
towards stabilizing stock prices, hence economic activity. That literature is however not yet 
linked to the work surveyed above. But the distance between the two has narrowed, as in the 
work of Greenwald and Stiglitz on "Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles" 
(1993) where firms are modeled as maximizing an expected utility of future market value. 
To conclude, there are several clear indications that "the newly emerging theory of incomplete 
markets provides a useful framework for unifying these subfields and for clarifying the mutual 
dependence between real, financial and monetary phenomena". The contributions of Peter 
Diamond (1967), Roy Radner (1972) and Jacques Drèze (1974) were indeed seminal to the 
emergence of a theory that keeps evolving. The long awaited second volume of Magill and 
Quinzii's book will be most welcome in summing up its recent developments.  
 
________________________________ 
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 A consumption channel inspired by the life-cycle theory of savings and an investment channel inspired by 
Tobin’s q.  
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